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NOTES.
BANKS

AND BANKING-COLLECTION OF DRAFT----WHEN

TITLE

PASSES.-A corporation deposited with an Indianapolis bank, a draft
on a Baltimore company. As between the depositor and the bank,
it was customary for the latter to enter each draft to the company's
credit as cash, the proceeds to be subject to check as soon as entered
on the company's pass-book. Having so entered the draft in suit,
the bank sent it to -a Baltimore bank for collection. The drawee
paid it, but later in the same day sought to hold the Baltimore bank
as garnishee on a foreign attachment taken out against the original
depositor of the draft. The Baltimore bank pleaded nulla bona, and
judgment was rendered in its favor, the court holding that title to
the draft had passed to the Indianapolis bank at the time of deposit.,
As pointed out by the court, there are two previous Maryland
decisions on much the same question, in both of which it is said,
though by way of dictum, that, under similar circumstances, title
passes from the depositor to the bank, when the indorsement is in
'Auto and Accessories Mfg. Co. v. Merchants' National Bank, 81 Atl.
Rep. 294 Md. (911).
(331)
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blank or to the bank itself.2 In the present case there was a general
indorsement to the bank, and this fact, coupled with the additional
facts that the amount of the draft was immediately credited to the
depositing company as cash, and could be drawn upon at once, were
considered as controlling the situation, there being no evidence to
show that the parties lookedupon the transaction in a different light.
There was also the positive testimony of the cashier of the Indianapolis bank to the effect that the bank treated such drafts of the
depositor as discounts, though he did not state that they were
actually discounted. But although this was the practice of the bank,
there was no agreement with the company that it should be done.
The decision of a question such as is raised in the principal case
depends largely on the presence or absence of certain facts, which
may, by themselves, seem unimportant, but are, when taken together,
the turning points of the decisions. A specific agreement between the
bank and the depositor that the proceeds of the latter's drafts shall
be credited to him at once as cash-the discount being deducted-is
recognized as constituting a sale of the paper to the bank. On the
other hand, if there was no such agreement, and the depositor indorsed the paper "for collection and credit to" himself, the courts
that title
consider such a transaction as a bailment or trust, and hold
to the draft does not pass to the bank upon its deposit. 3 But there
are cases which lie between the two classes just noticed; and it is
with these that the courts have some difficulty. Where a depositor
sends a check or draft to his bank marked "for deposit to the credit
of" himself, and the amount is credited to him as cash, he having
the right to draw against such deposit, it has been considered that
title to the draft passed absolutely to the bank, though there was no
specific agreement between the parties on the matter. 4 The court
in the Minnesota case just referred to, citing a prior case in that
State, said: "Upon a deposit being made by a customer in a bank,
in the ordinary course of business, of money, checks, drafts, or other
negotiable paper received and credited as money, the title of the
money, drafts, or other paper immediately becomes the property of
the bank, which becomes debtor to the depositor for the amount
unless a different understanding affirmatively appears." It will be
seen that this covers the present case. However, the contrary view5
was maintained in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Again, different weight is to be attached to certain facts, depending
upon whether the draft is "sight" or "time" paper. If it is the
'Tyson v. Rawls, 77 Md. 412 (1893); Ditch v. Western National Bank
of Balto., 79 Md. r92 (894).
*McCleod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 4o (1886) ; 2 Morse on Banks and Banking,
Fourth Edition, sec. 583a.
' Security Bank of Minn. v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 58 Minn. 141 (1894);
dictum in Craigie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131 (885), where the general doctrine
to this effect is said not to be open to question.
' Beal v. City of Somerville, 5o Fed. Rep. 647 (1892).
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former, the question of most importance, according to some authorities, is whether the bank can charge back the amount of the
draft to the depositor's account, in case, for any reason, it cannot
be collected. 6 This is disputed in Maryland 7 and Kansas,8 where
it is said that the right of the bank to charge back is really only
a recognition of its rights as indorsee, "and hence is not in any sense
inconsistent with ownership." As regards "time" paper, the controlling element seems to be the nature of the entry on the books
of the bank. If the full amount of the draft is credited to the
depositor, it is held that a sale of the paper has not taken place, 9
but if the proceeds only are credited; i. e., the amount of the draft,
less the discount, title has passed to the bank.' 0 The mere fact that
the depositor may draw on the bank immediately after the deposit
of the draft is generally considered not to indicate a transfer of
ownership." There seems to be a divergent opinion, however, as to
whether the fact that the credit is given as cash has the effect of
passing title,' 2 there being no element of greater weight-such as
an agreement of the parties-to determine the question.
It will thus be seen that the law on this subject is not uniform,
although, as has already been said, some of the supposed conflict of
authority is due to the fact that in many apparently irreconcilable
cases there are seemingly unimportant elements which serve to distinguish and reconcile them. The only general statement which can
safely be made as to the whole question is that it is one of fact,
depending on the circumstances which exist in each case.
L.C.A.
CARRiERS-DEPOT

REGULATIONS-ExCLUSIvE

LICENSE

TO

TUG BOAT COMPANY.-The question of the obligation of a common

carrier to afford equal privileges in and about its depots, to persons,
not themselves passengers, shippers or consignees, who seek the
business of removing the persons or goods carried from the depot,
was raised in an interesting way in the recent case of BakerWhiteley Coal Co. v. B. & 0. R. R. Co.' The defendant railroad
'Armour Packing Co. v. Davis, r18 N. C.548 (1896); Zane on Banks and
Banking, sec. 133.

'Ditch v. Bank, supra.
'Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kan. 336 (i9o5). Accord: Trust and Savings
Bank v. Mfg. Co., 150 Ill.
336 (1894).
'Giles v. Perkins, 9 East, 12 (1807).
16 Carstairs, et al., v. Bates, 3 Campbell, 301 (1812).
"Balbach v. Frelinghuysen, 15 Fed. Rep. 675 (1883). 2 Morse on Banks
and Banking, Fourth Edition, sec. 583c.
"Kavanaugh v. Bank, 59 Mo. App. 540 (1894), and Amer. Ex. Nat'l
Bank of Chicago v. Gregg, 37 Ill.
App. 425 (I89O), hold that in such a case
title has passed. Contra: Beal v. City of Somerville, supra.
1 188 Fed. 405 (igl,).
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company had established a pier in Curtis Bay, near Baltimore, which
was held out and used as an ordinary railway freight station for shipments of coal. It contracted to give the exclusive right of docking
vessels at the pier to a tug-boat company, a business rival of the
complainant. The complainant 'had a contract with the owners of
the steamship "Horda" to tow her to the pier where she was to
load with coal. On attempting to perform the contract the complainant's hawsers were cast off and it was prevented from docking
the vessel. The complainant brought a bill praying that the defendant be restrained from enforcing the regulation made necessary by
its contract. The Court conceded that the tracks and station of a
railroad company continue to be private property although devoted
to public use and that they were subject to reasonable regulation
by the railroad, but held that the contract in question was void as an
attempt, under guise of regulations for the use of the wharf, to limit
the right to approach it over the navigable waters of the United
States, to a single person.
There is a very interesting line of cases raising this and
kindred questions, and it is submitted that an examination of them,
while it leads to the conclusion that the decision in the principal
case is correct, discloses a slightly different ground on which a
more logical ratio decidendi of the case might have been pronounced.
These cases seem to fall into three general classes.
The first class of case deals with the carrier's right to regulate
fhe use of that part of its private property which is the real essential
of its equipment as carrier and over which its statutory monopoly
extends, that is, its rails. Here its right is absolute so long as it
gives the public uniform and efficient service. "If this is done the
railroad owes no duty to the public as to the particular agencies it
shall select for that purpose. The public require carriage but the
company may choose its own appropriate means of carriage, always
provided they are such as secure reasonable promptness and
security." 2 So also a carrier owes no duty to handle impartially the
sleeping cars of every car company which wishes to serve the public
on its trains.- Within the limits of its statutory monopoly, a carrier
' Express Cases, 117 U. S. I (1885). In these cases certain express companies sought to restrain certain railroads from discriminating against them
in the matter of the accommodation afforded express companies in general.
The bills were dismissed. The result of the case is tersely summed up
by Baker, J., in his opinion in Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 120 Fed. 215
(i9o3) : "The railroad company is a common carrier of merchandise, but not
a common carrier of common carriers of merchandise."
See the words of Mr. Justice
'Pullman Cases, 139 U. S. 24 (189o).
Harlan, at page 89: "Its duty, as carrier of passengers was to make suitable
provision for their comfort and safety. Instead of furnishing its own dining
room and sleeping cars as it might have done, it employed the plaintiff whose
special business it was to provide cars of that character, to supply as many as
were necessary to meet the requirements of travel * * * it was a matter
of indifference to the public who owned them." See also Barney v. Steam-
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can exclude all others who wish to serve its passengers, or give exclusive licenses for such service. It owes no duty of uniform service
to such persons.
The second class of case is where the railroad attempts to regulate the use of the public highway adjacent to its stations. It is
universally agreed that this cannot be done. "But the right of the
railroad company, as abutting owner, and the rights of passengers
are not in their nature paramount to the rights of others of the
general public, to use the side walk in question, in legitimate ways
and for legitimate purposes. Licensed hackmen and cabmen, unless
prohibited by valid local regulations, may, within reasonable limits,
use a public sidewalk in prosecuting their calling, provided such use
is not materially obstructional in its nature." I The freedom of
those soliciting business from passengers, to use the public highway
without regulation by the carrier, was upheld by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Godbout v. Depot Co."
The third class of case presents facts falling between those of
the two classes already discussed. The question raised is the right
of the carrier to regulate the solicitation of business from passengers
by hackmen on the platforms, or within the depot or adjacent private
property, of the carrier. All cases agree that the carrier may make
reasonable regulations which do not discriminate between parties
soliciting such business.8 As to granting exclusive licenses to hackmen and the like to solicit within the depot, the cases have been in
conflict; 7 but the more recent decisions seem to recognize this right
in the railroads.8 It is universally admitted, however, that an exclusive license which is held valid, does not prohibit a private conveyance from entering the depot or grounds to receive the owner
boat Co., 67, N. Y. 301 (1876); Kates v. Atlanta Baggage Co., lo7 Ga. 636

(899).

'Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279 (1905). The Circuit Court
had enjoined the hackmen in this case "from congregating on the sidewalk,
in front of, adjacent to, or about, the entrances and there soliciting the custom
of passengers." "This injunction," said the Court of Appeals, "was too
broad; the congregating that may be restrained in this suit is only such as
interferes with the ingress and egress of passengers and employees." This
seems-to recognize that the only right a railroad has in the abutting highway is the easement common to all owners of abutting property.
'47 L. R. A. 532 (9oo).
'Cole v. Rowen (Mich., i89i), 13 L. R. A. 848. A regulation assigning
a special place to each cabman was upheld. See also: Hutchinson on
Carriers' Second Edition, Section 522; I Fetter on Carriers, Section 245.
, Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 61 L. R. A. 140, and note; Cole v. Rowen,
13 L. R. A. 848 (Mich., 1891) and note; Godbout v. Depot Co. (Minn., igoo);
47 L. R. A. 532, and note; Hutchinson on Carriers, Second Edition, Sections
522, 523; I Fetter on Carriers, Section 245
"Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., '99 U. S. 279 (1905); Oregon Short
Line v. Davidson, 33 Utah 370 (i9o8); Note to last case in io L. R. A.
(N. S.) 777; Railroad v. Brown, 177 Mass. 65 (igoo), affirming Old Colony
R. R. v. Toupp, 147 Mass. 35 (1888).
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or his goods; and for this purpose a public vehicle previously hired,
is considered a private vehicleY
The Court reached its decision in the principal case on the theory
that it was dealing with a case of the second class: that the railroad
.by the regulation in question, sought to restrict the use of adjacent
navigable waters of the United States by independent tug-boat
owners. The Court assumed that a tug-boat in docking a vessel
makes no use of the pier proper, but only of the surrounding waters.
"He (complainant) does not ask to be allowed to go upon the pier
or other property of the defendant, or make any use of it for the
purpose of soliciting business or otherwise, as claimed by the hackmen." It is submitted that this is too nice a distinction in fact,
and that the decision could have been reached more rationally by
considering the case as one under the exception to the third class
of case discussed in relation to private conveyances. The facts
showed that the coal was delivered at the pier "to whatever vessel
or vessels the shippers or consignee of the same may designate."
The steamer "Horda" was the private vessel of the consignee; and in
bringing her to the pier, the services of a tug-boat were no less
necessary than are those of a driver to a vehicle on land. It is also
true that the complainant's contract to dock the steamer was made
previous to the docking; and the case was not one of a tug soliciting business at the pier, but of the right to the use of the pier by a
tug already in contract with the person whose legal right it was to
receive the coal.
F.L.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT.-In a

LAW-VIOLATION

OF

recent case in Georgia'

THE

THIRTEENTH

the question before

the court was the constitutionality of those sections of the Penal

Code making it a misdemeanor to contract to perform services
with intent not to perform them; 2 and making satisfactory
proof of the contract and the failure to perform, primza facie evidence of an intent to defraud.3 The court held the first provision
constitutional, and refused to discuss the second as it was not before
them under the facts of the case. The argument of the court was
that it was not the breach of contract that was made a crime, but
the intent to defraud, and the actual defrauding of another by virtue
of such intent. There is no reason why fraudulent practices should
not be made crimes, and if in the course of their punishment, the
'Griswold v. Webb,
Lea 413 (Tenn., 1881) ; I
33 How. Pr. 481 (N. Y.,
"Latson v. Wells, 71

I., 1889); Summitt v. State, 8
Fetter on Carriers, Section 245; Masterson v. Short,
1867).
S. E. :052 (Ga., I911).
19 AtI. Rep. 143 (R.

Ga. Penal Code, 1g1o, Sec. 715.

'Ga. Penal Code, igio, Sec. 716.

NOTES
guilty person is compelled to perform an obligation, this is not involuntary servitude within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The question is ably discussed in the leading case of Bailey v.
Alabama.4 The facts in that case differed from those in Latson
v. Wells only in that the statutory provisions were all included
in one section instead of two separate ones. The act was held
unconstitutional. Justice Hughes in his opinion says, in effect,
that before the amendment making the refusal to perform
printa facie evidence of an intent to defraud, the act did not make
the mere breach a crime. The intent was the essential ingredient,
and this had to be proved. In the case at bar there was no intent
to defraud or at least no evidence of it; but the defendant could not
testify that he did not intend to injure or defraud. He stood stripped
by the statute of the presumption, and exposed to conviction for
fraud upon evidence only of contracting and failing to fulfill -his
obligation. If the service is rendered in liquidation of a debt, there
is no punishment. Though the statute in terms is to punish fraud,
still its natural effect is to expose to punishment for crime, those
who fail or refuse to perform their contracts; and judging its purpose
by its effect, it seeks in this way to provide the means of compulsion through which performance of such service may be secured.
Objection to the constitutionality of these statutes was made
under the Thirteenth Amendment and the protecting generalities of
the words "involuntary servitude." That these words are not confined to African slavery but apply to civil freedom in general, there
can be no doubt.' In accordance with this interpretation, Congress
has legislated against peonage,6 and this, it is held in Bailey v. Alabama, "necessarily includes all legislation which seeks to compel the
service or labor by making it a crime to refuse or fail to perform it."
The opinion continues; "if it (the state) cannot punish the servant
as a criminal for the mere failure or refusal to serve without paying
his debt, it is not permitted to accomplish the same result by enacting
a statutory presumption which, upon proof of no other fact, exposes
him to conviction .and punishment." In view of this language, it is
difficult to see how the Georgia court in the principal case, distinguishes their decision on the ground that it was the evidentiary
portion of the Alabama statute that influenced the United States
Supreme Court, and that there was nothing in that decision that
declared the main body of the statute unconstitutional.
4219 U.

'Civil

(I9O5).

S. 219 (I910).

Rights Cases, io9 U. S. 2o (1883) ; Op. Atty's Gen'l, VoL

25,

477

"I have no hesitation in saying that any person held to labor or
service against his will, although he may have voluntarily contracted to
submit himself to such control is in a condition of involuntary servitude
within the meaning of the constitution."
'Revised Statutes, Sec. iWo.
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No cases other than those mentioned, bring up the point of the
refusal to perform being prima facie evidence; and only a few have
presented the main question. Of these, the trend seems to be that
such an act is constitutional.' In spite of the opinion in Bailey v.
Alabama, we are much impressed with the dissent in that case, of
Mr. Justice Holmes. He points out that making a breach of contract
a crime is merely a question of the quantum of compulsion. Any
legal liability has this effect, and the addition of criminal liability
to a fine or damages, simply intensifies the legal motive for doing
right; it does not create it. To hold otherwise, is saying that the
Thirteenth Amendment outlaws contracts for labor. Compulsory
work for no private master in a jail is not peonage. If work in a
jail is not condemned in itself, without regard to what conduct it
punishes, it may be made a consequence of any conduct that the
state has power to punish. Moreover no person is required to
enter into such a contract unless he chooses to do so; and if he does
so, he must take the consequences applied by the law to the violation
of a contract into which he has voluntarily entered, just as he subjects himself to any other penalties of the law." There seems no
reason why making the actual breach prima facie evidence should
alter these considerations. The fact is to be merely prima facie
evidence: it is not conclusive. Standing alone, it does not necessarily determine the guilt of the accused. 9 In most cases of this
sort, if the party breaking the contract has good reason for so doing
and does not intend to defraud, he is able to prove it, whereas it is
usually impossible for the other party to prove fraudulent motive
in leaving his employment. A statute providing that one fact shall
be prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue is not unconstitutional if there is a rational connection between the fact and the ultimate fact presumed.10 In view of these considerations and the
state of the law on the subject it is unfortunate that the Supreme
Court of Georgia in Latson v. Wells felt compelled to reconcile their
decision with Bailey v. Alabama, instead of openly expressing what
their opinion certainly intimates-that these statutes considered
separately or together are constitutional.
C. H. S. Jr.
PARTNERSHIP-DISSOLUTION-POWERS

OF

A

PARTNER.-On

December 15th, one of two partners retired from the firm and notified the plaintiff bank of this fact, having previously instructed it
T
Ex Parte Riley, 94 Ala. 82 (I89I); State v. Williams, 32 S. C. 123
(I889), but cf. Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1872), presenting a
decision contra, on an analogous statute.
' State v. Williams, supra, cf. statement in Op. A. G., Vol. 25, 477 (195o).
'Bailey v. State, 161 Ala. 78 (9o9).
0
M. J. & K R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35 (igio).

NOTES
not to loan any more money to the partnership. According to the
regular method of the partners in conducting their business, December I5th was the day on which they were accustomed to discharge
the indebtednesses incurred between November 15th and December
Ist. Between December Ist and I5th, the remaining partner had
issued a number of firm checks in discharge of firm obligations
which would have overdrawn the account had 'he not gone to the
plaintiff bank and made a note for $4oo in the firm name. It was
held in First National Bank of Antigo, v. Larsen 1 that the retiring
partner was liable on this note, there being some evidence of 'his
acquiescence in the liquidation by his co-partner.
The position which the court takes is that the partners were
liable on the checks drawn before December 15th, and were liable
also on the original indebtedness to the various persons to whom
the checks were issued; that the recovery, therefore, was substantially
based on the original indebtedness, and the mere fact that it was
nominally on the notes should not preclude recovery.
It is well settled by the great weight of authority that after
the dissolution of a partnership, one partner cannot bind the other
by any new engagements that he may enter into in the firm name, 2
even though he be entrusted with the liquidation of the affairs of the
partnership, and although the obligation entered into be for the
purpose of discharging an antecedent indebtedness to the firm., This
is predicated on the theory that the mutual agency is revoked ipso
facto by the dissolution, and all obligations subsequently entered into
are purely personal. Pennsylvania is the only jurisdiction which substantiates the position taken by the Wisconsin court.4
If the bill or note be drawn before the dissolution of the partnership, but is not issued until afterward, liability attaches to the retired
partner. 5 But if, on the other hand, a piece of negotiable paper is
issued in the firm nanie before dissolution and, upon falling due
after dissolution, is renewed by the liquidating partner in the firm
1132 N. W. Rep. 6Io (Wis. I911).
"Abel v. Sutton, 3 Espinasse, io8 (18o2); Dolman v. Orchard, 2 C. & P.
8O4 (1825) ; Heath iv. Sansom, 4 B. & Ad. 172 (1832) ; In re Fraser, 2 Q. B.
633 (1892); Fontaine v. Lee's, Admrs., 6 Ala. 889 (1845); Curry v. White,

51 Cal. 530 (1876) ; Tombeckbee Bank v. Dunell, 5 Mason, 56 (1828); Bates
on Partnership, 694; Burdick on Partnership, 225; Lindley on Partnership,

245; Pollock on Partnership, Part I, Sec. 38; Shumaker on Partnership, 430;
Story on Partnership, 322.
"Kilgour v. Finlyson, i H. Black, 156 (1789) ; Burr v. Williams, 2o Ark.
7E (1859); Bower v. Douglass, 25 Ga. 714 (1858) ; Hayden v. Cretcher, 75
Ind. io8 (i88r); Bank of Montreal v. Page, 98 Ill. log (1881); Montague
v. Reakert, 6 Bush. 393 Ky. (1869); Perrin v. Keene, 19 Me. 355 (8855);
Hurst v. Berry, 8 Md. 399 (1855); Haddock v. Crocheron, 32 Tex. 276
(1869); Lockwood v. Comstock, 4 McLean, 383 (1848); 3 Kent's Comm. 63,
14th Ed.; 32 Lrans. 255.
'Robinson v. Taylor, 4 Pa. 242 (1846); McCowin v. Cubbison, 72 Pa.

358 (1872); Lloyd v. Thomas, 79 Pa. 68 (1875).
'Lewis v. Reilly, i Q. B. 348 (1841).
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name, no liability attaches. 6 -Ithas been said by way of dictum
that while firm paper issued after dissolution in payment of preexisting obligations is not binding on the retired partner, a simple
acknowledgement of indebtedness given by the liquidating partner
would be binding on the retired partner.7 The rule that an express
authority to use the firm nane after dissolution is necessary in
order to fasten the liability seems to be favored.8
The decision of the Wisconsin court is to be criticised not so
much for the adoption of a view which is decidedly in the minority
as for the reasoning by which the conclusion is reached. Perhaps
the administration of justice requires a slight relaxation of the old
pleading rules but it is submitted that the court's action is in effect
a disregard of all substantive rights.
C.A.S.

PLEDGE-RIGHT OF THE PLEDGEE TO BECOME A PURCHASER.The pledgee of securities given as collateral for certain notes
upon which the pledgor was bound, bought in, at his own sale, ccrtain stock not covered by the authority given to sell at public or
private sale, and to become the purchaser at such sale. Upon suit
brought against the pledgor for the balance due on the notes, he
filed a cross-bill, alleging that the pledgee bank had no authority to
sell and buy in the stock, and charged the bank with being guilty
of a conversion. It was held that the bank was not guilty of a
conversion as the stock was still in its possession. The Chancellor
directed that the stock be sold, that the proceeds of the sale be
credited upon the note, and that after such credit, a decree be givcn
against the defendant for the remainder due upon the notes.'
The first definition of a pledge was given by Lord Holt, in the
case of Coggs v. Bernard: 2 "when goods or cbattels are delivered
to another as a pawn, to be security to him for money borrowed
of him by the bailor." A pledge differs from a lien, which is the
mere right to retain possession and which is lost when the possession
is surrendered. By the contract of pledge, the pledgor invests thepledgee, not only with the mere right of possession, but with the right
to deal with the thing pledged as his own, if the debt is not paid
and the thing redeemed at the appointed time. The contract con8
tinues in force until the pledge is redeemed or sold.
'Van Valkenburg v. Bradley, r4 Ia.io8 (1862); Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio
St. 21 (1854); Parker v. Cousins, 2 Grat. 372 Va. (1845). But see contra,
Megram v. Abel, 189 Pa. 215 (I8_g).
'Smith v. Shelden, 35 Mich. 42 (1876).
"Potter v. Tolbert, 113 Mich. 486 (1897); 32 L. R. A. N. S. 258, and
cases there cited.
'Holston Nat. Bank v. Wood, 140 S. W. Rep. 31 (IgII).
22 Ld. Raymond, gog, 913 (1702).
'Donald v. Suckling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 585 (i866).

NOTES
It is generally conceded today that, upon default by the pledgor,
the pledgee has a choice of any one of the following remedies:4
(i) He may proceed personally against the pledgor for his debt
without selling the collateral security.5 This remedy does not in
any way affect his lien by virtue of the pledge. (2) He may file
a bill in chancery and have a judicial sale under a regular decree
of foreclosure. The civil and the early common law rule was that
a pledge could not be sold without a decree of the court, unless
there was an agreement to the contrary. This method is used today in
cases where the pledge covers indefinite and unascertained accounts,6 or where the pledgor cannot be found to be served with
notice of the sale. 3 He may sell without judicial process upon giving reasonable notice to the debtor to redeem.7 If the pledgee resorts to the last method, he is liable for a conversion, if he sells
without giving the required notice to the pledgor 8 or if he sells at
a private sale," unless the contract of pledge waives the right, to
notice or authorizes a private sale. The reason for this rule is that
the sale has put it out of the pledgee's power to re-deliver the
pledge, upon tender or payment of the debt which it secures.
It is unlawful for the pledgee to directly or indirectly purchase
at his own sale, 10 as he stands in a fiduciary relation to the pledge,
and like a trustee, he is not permitted to buy in property so committed
to his charge. His duty to the pledgor is inconsistent with his
interest as a purchaser. His duty to the pledgor is to get the highest
price which the property will bring and his interest as a purchaser
is to get it as cheaply as possible. However, a purchase by the
pledgee does not of itself amount to a conversion, as the pledgee is
still in a position to fulfill his contract."- Under the contract the
pledgee is entitled to retain possession of the pledge until the debt
or engagement for which the security was given, is discharged by
tender, payment or performance. His obligation is to return the
property to the pledgor upon performance of the agreement by
him.
'Robinson v. Hurley, ii Iowa, 410 (i86o).
'Taylor v. Cheever, 72 Mass. 146 (1856).
*Conyngham's Appeal, 57 Pa. 474 (1868).
t
Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 227 (1847).
'Stevens v. Hurlbut, 31 Conn. 146 (1862); Gay v. Moss, 34 Cal. 125
(i867); Feige v. Bur, 1x8 Mich. 243 (8.98).
'Strong v. Nat. Mechanics Bkg. Asso., 45 N. Y. 718 (1871).
"Chicago Artesian Well Co. v. Corey, 6o Ill. 73 (1871); Stokes v.
Frazier, 72 Ill. 428 (1874) ; Killian v. Hoffman, 6 I1. App. Cases, 200 (i88o) ;
Md. Fire Ins. Co. v. Dalrynple, 25 Md. 242 (1866); Sharpe v. Nat. Bank of
Birmingham, 87 Ala. 644 (1888); Middlesex Bank v. Minot's Admr., 45
Mass. 325 (1842). See also cases under notes II, 12, 13 14 and 15, supra.
"'Winchester v. Joslyn, 31 Colo. 220 (19o3) ; Appleton v. Turnbull, 84

Me. 72 (i89i); Terry v. Birmingham Nat. Bank, 93 Ala. 539 (i89o); Bryan
v. Baldwin, 52 N. Y. 232 (1873).
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The rights of the pledgor, in case of a purchase by the pledgee,
are to affirm or disaffirm the sale. It is not void, but voidable. If
the pledgor elect to treat the sale as void the pledgee continues to be
held under the original agreement, leaving the rights of the parties
unaffected. Upon tender of the debt and refusal by the pledgee to
return the pledge there is a conversion and the lien is discharged.' 2
If the pledgor affirms the sale, he may hold the pledgee liable for the
amount bid by him at the sale, and the pledgee cannot recover the
full amount of the debt from the pledgor, but will be forced to
allow the proceeds of the sale to be set off against his claim. 8 The
right to avoid the sale, in case the pledge is afterwards sold to a
purchaser for value, is lost if not exercised within a reasonable
time, " and even though there be no subsequent sale, if the pledgor
does not disaffirm the sale by a tender, within a reasonable time
after he has knowledge 5that the pledgee was the purchaser, he is
taken to have affirmed it.'
The principles governing the decree of the chancellor in the
case of Holston National Bank v. Wood are, therefore, sound in
reason and in accordance with the previous decisions upon the ques-

'tion.' 8

R.B.W.
PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-RALRAD RIGHT OF WAY.-

The D. L. & W. R. R. Co. acquired, by deed of purchase, a
strip of land outside of, but adjoining, its right of way. For more
than fifty years the company did absolutely nothing to indicate that
it had any purpose whatever in acquiring the property. In an action
of ejectment, the defendant proved adverse possession of the
premises for longer than the statutory period. The plaintiff company contended that the property was purchased with a view of
making it part of the right of way, and that, consequently, title to
it could not be acquired by adverse user. Held, that although no part
of the right of way of a railroad company can be acquired by adverse
possession, there is no authority for holding that property of a railroad company not included in its right of way, may not be so
acquired. Nothing is included in the right of way except that which
may lawfully be the subject of condemnation, and when a railroad
company asserts a public use in land it has purchased, to overcome
'Hyams

v. Bamberger, io Utah I (1894).

"Faulkner v. Hill, IO4 Mass. 188 (7870).
"Lord v. Hartford, i75 Mass. 320 (igoo); Hayward v. Nat. Bank, 96
U. S. 611 (1877).

"Hill v. Finigan, 77 Cal. 267 (1888); First Nat. Bank of Kansas City
v. Rusk, 85 Fed. 539; McDowell v. Chicago Steel Works, =24 Ill. 491 (1889);

Geer v. Lafayette Co. Bank, 128 Mo. 559 (1895).
1'For a general note on the subject of pledges, see note to the case of
Glidden v. Mechanics' Bank, 53 Ohio, 588 ('895), in 43 L. R. A. 737.

NOTES
the adverse possession by another, its claim can only be sustained
by showing the existence of conditions which would have permitted
it to1 condemn land in the first instance, or actual dedication to such
use.
The theory of this case is based on the Constitution of Pennsylvania 2 and is, that land which forms the railroad's right of way
is impressed with a public use,3 and is to be considered as a public
highway; consequently title to it cannot be acquired by adverse user.
Since, in order to acquire land by condemnation proceedings, it is
necessary to prove a public use,4 title to it is said to be unable to be
lost by the adverse user of another. But, in regard to land purchased
by a railroad company, the statute of limitations is applicable unless
the owner can prove that it is being devoted to a public use.5
The United States Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion by a different line of reasoning. In the case of N. Pac.
R. R. v. Townsend,6 Congress had granted to a railroad company
for a right of way, land which a third party subsequently claimed- to
have acquired by adverse use. White, J., said: "That in effect
the grant was of a limited fee, made on an implified condition of
reverter in the event that the company ceased to use or retain
the land for the purpose for which it was granted. * * *
To give such efficiency to the statute as would confer a title on the
defendant would be to allow that to be done by indirection which
could not be done directly."
Other cases deny the theory and conclusion of the principal
case. "A railroad company owes certain duties to the public, but it
holds and uses its property for the profit of its stockholders. The cases holding that the statute of limitations affords
no defence to actions for encroachment upon streets and roads are
inapplicable. A railroad is not a public highway in the sense that
it belongs to the people. . . . The state confers the power of
eminent domain to enable railway companies to perform efficiently
their duties as common carriers. But it is not apparent why the
state should be concerned in preventing investors in railway stocks
from sustaining loss through the negligence of their agents
(directors)." 7 The logic of this case is clear and unanswerable: if
a railroad right of way has been held adversely for twenty-one
years, not only was there no public use for it, but the interests of

'D. L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Tobyhana Co., 8I AtI. 132 (Pa., i911).'
'Art. 17: "All railroads and canals shall be public highways," etc.
'Reading Co. v. Seip, 3o Pa., Super. 33o (igo6).
'P. & L. Dig. of Dec., Vol. 5, Col. 8o44.
'Lehigh V. R. R. v. Frank, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 624 (i9o9). Accord: So.
Pac. R. R. v. Hyatt, 132 Cal. 24o (igoi); Rwy. Co. v. Smith, 170 Mo. 327
(i9o2); R. R. Co. v. McCaskill, 94 N. C. 746 (I886).

a190

U. S. 267 (i9o2).

'Pgh., etc., Rwy. Co. v. Stickley, 155 Ind. 32 (i9oo).
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the public have not in the least been affected. This reasoning would
not apply to streets. When the occasion arises that the land is
needed as part of the right of way, it can then be acquired by
purchase or condemnation proceedings. The public is not damnified
by such a rule. "The possession by a railroad company of its roadbed is the possession by a corporation as its private property to
enable it to perform a public duty," s and, it is submitted,9 not
differing from the possession of property by any other public service
corporation. The courts of Illinois 9 and Mississippi 10 have adopted
this view. Other jurisdictions, notably Massachusetts, have seen fit
to alter it by statute.
M. G.

'Spottiswoode v. R. R. Co., 6I N. J. L. 322 (i8).
'Donahue v. R. R. Co., i65 Ill. 640 (1897).
Paxton v. R. L Co., 76 Miss. 536 (i898).
" St. of i86r, c. woo.

